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Summary
In 1998 and 1999, the United States and its NATO allies attempted to put an end
to escalating violence between ethnic Albanian guerrillas and Yugoslav/Serb forces
in Yugoslavia’s Kosovo province in southern Serbia.  These efforts culminated in a
78-day NATO bombing campaign (Operation Allied Force) against Serbia from
March until June 1999, when then-Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic agreed to
withdraw his forces from the province.  Since then, Kosovo has been governed by a
combination of U.N. and local Kosovar governing structures.  Under the terms of
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
retained ultimate political authority in the province for an interim period. A NATO-
led peacekeeping force, KFOR, was charged with providing a secure environment.
UNSC Resolution 1244 did not settle Kosovo’s disputed status, but called for
status to be considered at an undetermined time after an autonomous government is
in place.  Almost all ethnic Albanians want independence for Kosovo; Serbs say
Kosovo remains an integral part of Serbia.  In mid-2005, the U.N. launched a
comprehensive review of the Kosovo standards, or benchmarks of progress.  On this
basis, the U.N. Security Council endorsed the start of status negotiations for Kosovo
in early 2006 under the lead of former Finnish President Martii Ahtisaari. By the fall,
little movement toward a compromise solution was apparent, and Ahtisaari was
prepared to present a status proposal later in the year.  In November, however, he
postponed the release of his proposal until after Serbia holds key early elections on
January 21, 2007.  Following that vote, which produced an unsettled political
outcome, Ahtisaari presented his proposal for Kosovo’s status to the contact group
on January 26 and will bring it to Belgrade and Pristina on February 2.  The precise
timing of U.N. Security Council consideration of Kosovo’s future status has not yet
been determined.
The United States, in concert with other members of the international contact
group and the U.N. Security Council, has taken a leading role in international policy
on Kosovo.  The United States has committed peacekeeping troops to KFOR since
1999 and has upheld an “in together, out together” policy with respect to keeping
some U.S. forces in Kosovo along with the European allies. The U.S. Administration
had strongly pushed for the status question to be resolved by the end of 2006.  In
Congress, U.S. involvement in the 1999 Kosovo war was controversial; in 1999,
Congress neither explicitly approved nor blocked U.S. participation in NATO air
strikes against Serbia, and in 2000, several Members unsuccessfully attempted to
condition the U.S. military deployment in Kosovo on congressional approval and on
the implementation of aid pledges made by European countries.  In the 109th
Congress, some  resolutions were introduced that dealt with Kosovo’s future status.
In the 110th Congress, a resolution on Kosovo’s independence was introduced in the
House in January 2007 (H.Res. 36).   
For additional information, see CRS Report RS21721, Kosovo’s Future Status
and U.S. Policy,  and CRS Report RL32136, Future of the Balkans and U.S. Policy
Concerns, both by Steven Woehrel. This report will be updated as events warrant.
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Kosovo and U.S. Policy: 
Background and Current Issues
Introduction and Most Recent Developments
A U.N. envoy leading the international process to determine Kosovo’s future
status presented his settlement package to diplomats from the contact group on
January 26, 2007, in Vienna.  Former Finnish President Martii Ahtisaari, the U.N.
envoy, is next scheduled to bring his proposals to Belgrade and Pristina on February
2 for further consultation.  Although not yet a public document, the Ahtisaari plan
reportedly promotes Kosovo’s path toward independence with some constraints on
its sovereignty and safeguards for minority rights.  Ahtisaari claims that his proposal
presents a “foundation for a democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo.”
For the countries of the western Balkan region, especially Kosovo and Serbia,
2006 was an eventful year.  Nearly seven years after the NATO-led war over Kosovo
in 1999, U.N.-led negotiations on the future status of Kosovo began early in 2006,
and expectations for an imminent resolution to the territorial conflict over Kosovo
were elevated.  Later in the year, U.N. envoy Ahtisaari said that he was prepared to
put forward a status proposal in view of his assessment that the talks had reached
their limits in terms of usefulness and that the parties to the talks remained far apart
on most issues. In November, however, he announced that he would postpone
releasing his status proposal until after upcoming early elections in Serbia, scheduled
for January 21, 2007, ostensibly in order to avoid negatively influencing the outcome
of that election by boosting support for the extreme nationalist parties in Serbia.  In
the Serbian parliamentary vote, which was judged by international observers to be
free and fair, the nationalist Radical Party won the most votes; however, most
observers expect that the democratically oriented parties will form the next Serbian
government after possibly extensive coalition talks.
Following Ahtisaari’s consultations with the Serbian and Kosovar Albanian
parties, the status package will eventually be presented to the U.N. Security Council
for review and for the Council’s consideration of a new resolution on Kosovo. The
timing of U.N. action is not yet clear.  Moreover, consensus within both the
international contact group and the Security Council is far from assured; in particular,
Russia has expressed several reservations about Kosovo’s independence and its final
position is viewed as unpredictable. Meanwhile, many officials and observers are
concerned about the possibly destabilizing effect a prolonged delay of status may
have on the ground in Kosovo, as well as the ongoing risk of social unrest. The U.N.
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is expected to transition to a European Union-led
civilian presence after a status settlement, while NATO is expected to retain a
military presence in Kosovo for the near term. 
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U.S. Policy Overview
In 1998 and 1999, the United States and its NATO allies attempted to put an end
to escalating violence between ethnic Albanian guerrillas and Yugoslav forces in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Kosovo region.  They were outraged by Serb
security forces’ atrocities against ethnic Albanian civilians, and feared that the
conflict could drag in other countries and destabilize the region.  These efforts
culminated in a 78-day NATO bombing campaign against Serbia from March to June
1999.  Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic agreed to withdraw his forces from the
province in June 1999, clearing the way for the deployment of U.S. and other NATO
peacekeepers.  While NATO’s action ended Milosevic’s depredations in Kosovo, it
left U.S. and other Western policymakers with many difficult issues to deal with.
These included creating the conditions for the resumption of a normal life in Kosovo,
such as setting up autonomous governing structures and beginning reconstruction of
the war-torn province.  The thorny issue of Kosovo’s final status also loomed as
unfinished business, with important ramifications for stability in the entire western
Balkan region.
U.S. engagement in Kosovo has at times been controversial.  Proponents of U.S.
engagement say that instability in Kosovo could have a negative impact on the
stability of the Balkans and therefore of Europe as a whole, which they view as a vital
interest of the United States.  They believe instability in the region could produce an
environment favorable to organized crime and terrorism. In addition, they claim that
such instability could deal a damaging blow to the credibility and future viability of
NATO and Euro-Atlantic cooperation. They say the involvement of the United States
is critical to ensuring this stability, because of its resources and unrivaled political
credibility in the region.
Some critics say that the situation in Kosovo does not have as large an impact
on vital U.S. interests as other issues, particularly the war on terrorism in the wake
of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States and the war in Iraq.
Reflecting international focus on the global anti-terrorism campaign and other
priorities, there appears to be  a strong interest in “finishing the job,” including an
“exit strategy” for the international civil and military administration of Kosovo,
perhaps within the next year, as part of the determination of Kosovo’s future status.
However, a residual international civilian and military role, perhaps with a smaller
U.S. presence, is likely to stay on for some time after status is determined.
War in Kosovo: 
 February 1998-June 1999
Although the war in Kosovo had deep historical roots, its immediate causes can
be found in the decision of Milosevic regime in Serbia to eliminate the autonomy of
its Kosovo province in 1989. The regime committed widespread human rights abuses
in the following decade, at first meeting only non-violent resistance from the
province’s ethnic Albanian majority.  However, in 1998 ethnic Albanian guerrillas
calling themselves the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began attacks on Serbian
police and Yugoslav army troops.  The Milosevic regime responded with increasingly
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1 Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting, U.S. Department of State, December 1999.
violent and indiscriminate repression. From February 1998 until March 1999, conflict
between the KLA and Serb forces (as well as armed Serb attacks on ethnic Albanian
civilians) drove more than 400,000 people from their homes and killed more than
2,500 people.
The United States and
other Western countries used
sanctions and other forms of
pressure to try to persuade
Milosevic to cease repression
and restore autonomy to
Kosovo, without success. The
increasing deterioration of the
situation on the ground led the
international Contact Group
(United States, Britain, France,
Germany, Italy and Russia) to
agree on January 29, 1999 on a
draft peace plan for Kosovo.
They invited the two sides to Rambouillet, near  Paris, to start peace talks based on
the plan on February 6.  As an inducement to the parties to comply, on January 30 the
North Atlantic Council agreed to authorize NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana
to launch NATO air strikes against targets in Serbia, after consulting with NATO
members, if the Serb side rejected the peace plan.  NATO said it was also studying
efforts to curb the flow of arms to the  rebels.  The draft peace plan called for
three-year interim settlement that would provide greater autonomy for Kosovo within
Yugoslavia, and the deployment of a  NATO-led international military force to help
implement the agreement.  On March 18, 1999, the ethnic Albanian delegation to the
peace talks signed the plan, but the Yugoslav delegation rejected it.
NATO began air strikes on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on March 24,
1999.  Yugoslav forces moved rapidly to expel most of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians
from their homes, many of which were looted and burned.  A December 1999 State
Department report estimated the total number of refugees and displaced persons at
over 1.5 million, over 90% of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian population. The report said
that Yugoslav forces killed about 10,000 ethnic Albanians, and abused, tortured and
raped others.1 After 78 days of increasingly intense air strikes that inflicted damage
on Yugoslavia’s infrastructure and its armed forces,  President Milosevic agreed on
June 3 to a peace plan based on NATO demands and a proposal from the Group of
Eight countries (the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Russia
and Japan).  It called for the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo; the
deployment of an international peacekeeping force with NATO at its core; and
international administration of Kosovo until elected interim institutions are set up,
under which Kosovo will enjoy wide-ranging autonomy within Yugoslavia.
Negotiations would be eventually opened on Kosovo’s final status.
Kosovo at a Glance
Area: 10,849 sq.km., or slightly smaller than
Connecticut
Population: 1.956 million (1991 Yugoslav census)
Ethnic Composition: 82.2% Albanian; 9.9%
Serbian. Smaller groups include Muslims, Roma,
Montenegrins, Turks, and others (1991 census).
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2  For historical background to the conflict in Kosovo, see CRS Report RS20213, Kosovo:
Historical Background to the Current Conflict, by Steven Woehrel.  For chronologies of the
conflict in Kosovo, see CRS Report 98-752, Kosovo Conflict Chronology: January-August
1998, by Valerie Makino and Julie Kim; CRS Report RL30127, Kosovo Conflict
Chronology: September 1998-March 1999, by Julie Kim.
On June 9, 1999, NATO and Yugoslav military officers concluded a Military
Technical Agreement governing the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo.
On June 10, the U.N. Security Council approved UNSC Resolution 1244, based on
the international peace plan agreed to by Milosevic.  KFOR began to enter Kosovo
on June 11.  The Yugoslav pullout was completed on schedule on June 20.  On June
20, the KLA and NATO signed a document on the demilitarization of the KLA.2 
Within weeks of the pullout of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and the
deployment of  NATO-led peacekeeping force KFOR, the overwhelming majority
of ethnic Albanian refugees returned to their homes.  At the same time, more than
200,000 ethnic Serbs and other  minorities living in Kosovo left the province,
according to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. International officials
estimate the number of Serbs living in Kosovo at about 100,000.  Serbs in the
northern part of the province are concentrated in or near the divided town of
Mitrovica.  The rest are scattered in isolated enclaves in other parts of the province,
protected by KFOR troops.  A key reason for the departures is violence and
intimidation by ethnic Albanians, although some departures have been voluntary.
Meanwhile, some 15,000 so-called “minority returns” — or returns of displaced
persons to their homes in which they constitute an ethnic minority — have been
reported over the last several years.  Kosovo Serbs say that since the pullout of
Yugoslav forces, more than 1,100 were killed  and over 1,000 are missing. Hundreds
of houses of Serb refugees have been looted and burned.
Post-1999 Developments in Kosovo
Kosovo’s Governing Institutions  
Since June 1999, Kosovo has been primarily administered by the U.N. Mission
in Kosovo (UNMIK).  According to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, UNMIK
was tasked with gradually transferring its administrative responsibilities to
democratically elected, interim autonomous government institutions, while retaining
an oversight role. In a final stage, UNMIK was to oversee the transfer of authority
from the interim autonomous institutions to permanent ones, after Kosovo’s final
status is determined.
Kosovo had little to no governing experience, especially after it lost autonomy
under the rule of Milosevic.  Kosovo’s dominant political party had long been the
Democratic League of Kosova (LDK), formerly headed by Ibrahim Rugova, who had
led a shadow government during the Milosevic years.  After the war, new parties
emerged from the Kosovo Liberation Army.  The biggest of these was the
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), headed by Hashim Thaci. Another significant,
although smaller, ex-KLA group is the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), led
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3 The text of the constitutional framework can be found at [http://www.unmikonline.org/
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by Ramush Haradinaj.  The LDK initially lost some ground to the newer parties but
regained dominant support among the Kosovo Albanian population.  Kosovo’s first
postwar electoral process, municipal elections held in October 2000, resulted in an
LDK victory with 58% of the vote province-wide.  The PDK won 27.3% and the
AAK, 7.7%.  Kosovo Serbs boycotted, charging that UNMIK and KFOR have been
ineffective in protecting them from ethnic Albanian violence. 
After consultation with local leaders, UNMIK issued a Constitutional
Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo in May 2001.  The
Constitutional Framework called for the establishment of a 120-seat legislature,
which elects a President and a Prime Minister.  Twenty seats were reserved for ethnic
minorities, including ten for Serbs, but Serbs were not granted veto power on laws
passed by the ethnic Albanian majority in the body.  UNMIK retained oversight or
control of policy in many areas, including law enforcement, the judiciary,  protecting
the rights of communities, monetary and budget policy, customs, state property and
enterprises, and external relations.  UNMIK could invalidate legislation passed by the
parliament if in conflict with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244.  KFOR
remained in charge of Kosovo’s security.  The Constitutional Framework did not
address the question of Kosovo’s final status.
Leaders of ethnic Albanian parties voiced disappointment that the document did
not allow for a referendum to decide Kosovo’s final status.  They also said that the
Constitutional Framework gave the illusion of self-rule rather than the reality of it,
since UNMIK reserved many key powers. Kosovo Serb leaders condemned the
Constitutional Framework, saying it paved the way for Kosovo’s independence and
did not contain a mechanism to prevent the ethnic Albanian-dominated legislature
from abusing the rights of Serbs.3
The first postwar vote for Kosovo-wide institutions was the November 2001
legislative election.  The moderate LDK won 47 seats.  The PDK won 26 seats, and
the AAK won 8 seats.  Four small ethnic Albanian parties won one seat each. The
remaining 13 seats were won by parties representing the Bosniak, Turkish and Roma
communities.  In contrast to their boycott of the 2000 local elections, Kosovo Serbs
turned out in substantial numbers to vote in the November 2001 legislative elections.
A coalition of Serbian parties called Povratak, or Return, won 22 seats.  Turnout in
Serb-majority areas was about 47%, according to the OSCE, while turnout in Serbia
and Montenegro was about 57%.  (This compared with a turnout of about 67% in
Albanian-majority areas.)
After months of political wrangling,  the Assembly chose a President and a
government in March  2002.  LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova was elected as President.
Kosovo’s Prime Minister is Bajram Rexhepi of the PDK.  The government consisted
of members of the LDK, PDK and AAK.  One cabinet post was reserved for a
Kosovo Serb representative and another for a member of a non-Serb minority group.
The Kosovo Serbs initially refused to join the government, saying they wanted
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greater representation, but finally agreed to do so in May 2002, after UNMIK agreed
to appoint a Kosovo Serb as an advisor on refugee returns.  
Kosovo held its second local elections on October 2002.  Turnout for the vote
was 54%, lower than in the previous two elections.  Observers attributed the low
turnout to disillusionment with the performance of the government and political
parties in Kosovo.  The LDK confirmed its status as the leading party in Kosovo, but
lost ground compared to previous elections.  The LDK won 45% of the vote, the
PDK 29%, and the AAK 8.55%.  Serb turnout was particularly low, at about 20%.
Almost no Serbs voted in the troubled northern town of Mitrovica, where local
authorities intimidated potential voters.  Among those Serbs who did vote in the
elections, the moderate Povratak (Return) coalition did poorly, while hard-line parties
did well.  These results may have reflected continuing Serb dissatisfaction with their
situation in Kosovo, and with the failure of Serb moderates to improve it.  
In March 2004, accusations that local Serbs were responsible for the drowning
death of two ethnic Albanian boys near the divided city of Mitrovica erupted into
violent demonstrations and attacks on several ethnic Serb enclaves throughout the
province.  Large crowds of ethnic Albanians came out in droves and set fire to Serb
homes, churches and property in several cities.  U.N. and NATO personnel evacuated
some ethnic Serbs to protected enclaves but could not hold back the crowds or
counter the destruction.  The two days of violence on March 17-18, 2004, constituted
the worst flare-up of inter-ethnic violence since the end of the 1999 Kosovo war.
According to UNMIK, the two-day period resulted in the death of 19 civilians,
injuries to more than 900 persons, including international peacekeepers, and the
displacement of over 4,000 persons, mainly Serbs, from their homes. In addition,
about 30 churches and monasteries, 800 houses, and 150 vehicles were destroyed or
seriously damaged.  U.N. and other international officials assessed that the attacks
came about in part spontaneously, and in part as a result of an orchestrated campaign
by extremist forces.  Some referred to the attacks as “ethnic cleansing.”  The U.N.
estimated that tens of thousands of persons participated in dozens of violent incidents
in the two-day period.
Kosovo held new parliamentary elections on October 24, 2004.  On the
Albanian side, the results were largely in line with previous votes.  The LDK won
45.4% of the vote, and 47 seats in the 120 seat legislature.  The PDK won 28.9% and
30 seats.  The AAK won 8.4% of the vote and nine seats.  A new ethnic Albanian
party, ORA, led by publisher Veton Surroi, won seven seats, while four other ethnic
Albanian parties split five seats.  Turnout for the election was 53.57%.  Very few
Kosovo Serbs voted in the elections, responding to a call by Serbian Prime Minister
Vojislav Kostunica to boycott the election in the wake of the March violence.  Two
Serbian groups which did participate in the elections received the ten seats reserved
for the Serbian community in the legislature, but it was questionable whether they
genuinely represented Serbian sentiment in Kosovo.  Ten other seats were set aside
for other ethnic communities in Kosovo.  
On December 2, 2004, AAK leader Ramush Haradinaj was elected Prime
Minister of Kosovo by the new Kosovo parliament.  He led a new government
composed of a coalition between the AAK and LDK.  The PDK, a key part of the
previous government, went into opposition.  Haradinaj’s nomination was
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controversial, due to concerns of EU and other international officials that he could
be indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for war
crimes allegedly committed when he was a rebel leader.
On March 8, 2005, Prime Minister Haradinaj resigned, after The Hague tribunal
notified him and two of his associates that they had been indicted for crimes against
humanity and war crimes allegedly committed during the 1998-1999 conflict with
Serbian forces.  Haradinaj and his co-indictees flew to The Hague to submit to
detention.  Haradinaj was succeeded as Prime Minister by a political ally, Bajram
Kosumi.  Haradinaj had won high marks from international officials for his energetic
efforts to implement the standards. In June 2005, Haradinaj was provisionally
released by the Tribunal in return for his pledge to return to The Hague for his trial.
Without re-claiming a formal leadership position, Haradinaj is still thought to
exercise substantial leadership in the AAK and in his home region, although he is
expected to return to The Hague to face trial beginning in March 2007.
In mid-2005, the United Nations conducted a comprehensive review of the
situation in Kosovo as part of effort to determine whether to open a political process
designed to determine Kosovo’s future status (see section on status, below). The
review, conducted by U.N. envoy Kai Eide, included some praise for progress made
in the development of governing institutions (although without sufficient engagement
by the Kosovo Serbs) and landmark economic structures.  At the same time, the
review reported that the economic situation in Kosovo remained bleak and that
respect for the rule of law was a serious problem.  Prospects were poor for inter-
ethnic harmony and the return of significant numbers of displaced minorities.4  
On January 21, 2006, Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova died after a long bout
with cancer.  In February 2006, Fatmir Sejdiu, from Rugova’s LDK party, was
elected as President by the Kosovo parliament.  Later in the year, Sejdiu ran again for
President of the LDK and won the internal party vote.  In March 2006, Kosovo Prime
Minister Bajram Kosumi stepped down after criticism of his performance, even
within his own party.  He was replaced by Agim Ceku, who was formerly head of the
KLA and head of the Kosovo Protection Corps.  The new government pledged to
implement standards set by the international community for Kosovo, in preparation
for the determination of Kosovo’s status after ongoing U.N.-mediated talks are
concluded.
In preparation for the U.N.-led negotiation process on status, leaders of political
parties both in government and in the opposition formed a Unity Team, led by
President Sejdiu, to present a common front in the talks.  The Kosovo negotiation
team did not include minority representation from Kosovo Serbs, who have been
included on the Serbian side.  Some observers predict that it may become
increasingly difficult to hold the Unity Team together as its component parties look
ahead to the post-status political situation and new elections.  At the same time,
Kosovo’s leaders will likely face enormous challenges in implementing a status
settlement.  Since the death of Rugova, it has been hard to point to a single Kosovar
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Albanian leader with comparably broad popular appeal or stature.  In particular,
divisions plague the leading LDK party, and some of its members recently broke
away to form a new party headed by Nexhat Daci, former speaker of the Kosovo
assembly. In December 2006, President Sejdiu won an internal party vote to become
LDK chairman but may have to step down as Kosovo President if he keeps the party
chair. 
With expectations high for a status settlement favoring independence, local and
international observers have also warned of potential instability and mounting local
frustration if the status process is seriously thwarted.  Some analysts have referred to
a concept of “double disappointment” with respect to the evident lapse of previously
firm deadlines and the possibility of watering down a status settlement in order to
reach an international consensus.  On both the ethnic Albanian and Serb minority
side, the potential is high for instability pending a status solution.5
UNMIK and KFOR
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 (June 10, 1999) has formed the basis of
the international role in Kosovo since the end of the war.  The resolution authorized
the deployment of an international security presence in Kosovo, led by NATO, under
a mission to ensure the withdrawal of Yugoslav armed forces from Kosovo, the
demilitarization of the KLA, and the maintenance of the cease-fire.  Resolution 1244
gave the U.N. mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) the chief role in administering Kosovo
on a provisional basis. UNMIK’s duties included performing basic civil
administration of the province; maintaining law and order, including setting up an
international police force and creating local police forces; supporting humanitarian
aid efforts; facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes;
protecting human rights; supporting the reconstruction effort; preparing the way for
elections and the creation of self-government institutions; and facilitating a political
process to address Kosovo’s final status.  Resolution 1244 provided for an interim
period of autonomy for Kosovo until negotiations on the final status of the province
take place.  It expressed support for the FRY’s territorial integrity.
Bernard Kouchner of France served as the first Special Representative of the
U.N. Secretary-General (SRSG) to oversee UNMIK until January 2001.  He was
replaced by Hans Haekkerup, Denmark’s Defense Minister, whose brief term in
Kosovo ended in December 2001.  Michael Steiner, a German diplomat with
extensive experience in the former Yugoslavia, became the third SRSG in early 2002
and completed his term in July 2003.  Finnish diplomat Harri Holkeri became the
fourth SRSG in August 2003.  He stepped down in May 2004, citing health reasons,
although some observers speculated that his resignation was also spurred by
perceptions that his credibility, as well as that of UNMIK as a whole, had been
damaged by the March 2004 riots.  Danish diplomat Soren Jessen-Petersen, who had
been  the EU’s Special Representative in Macedonia, became the next SRSG in mid-
August.  Upon his arrival, he outlined five mission priorities: improving security,
prioritizing the standards and accelerating their implementation, transferring more
authority to the PISG, protecting minorities, and improving the economy. In June
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2006, Jessen-Petersen announced his early departure from UNMIK as of July.
Joachim Rücker of Germany succeeded Jessen-Petersen as SRSG in September 2006.
UNMIK initially had a four-pillar structure divided into humanitarian aid, civil
administration, democratic institution-building, and reconstruction.  UNMIK phased
out the humanitarian aid pillar in mid-2000 and added a police and justice pillar in
2001.  The United Nations leads the police and justice pillar as well as the one for
civil administration; the Organization for Security and Cooperation leads the
institution-building pillar; and the European Union leads the reconstruction pillar.
In April 2002, then UNMIK chief Steiner offered a “vision on how to finish our
job,” or an “exit strategy” for the international mission.  He outlined a “standards
before status” approach that included a series of benchmarks for Kosovo’s
institutions and society that should be achieved before addressing Kosovo’s final
status.  The benchmarks included the following: 
! the existence of effective, representative and functioning institutions;
! rule of law;
! freedom of movement;
! sustainable returns and reintegration;
! development of a sound basis for a market economy;
! clarity of property rights;
! normalized dialogue with Belgrade; and
! reduction and transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corps in line
with its mandate.6
The international community endorsed the “standards before status” approach.
However, even as UNMIK downsized and transferred a greater number of
administrative competencies to Kosovo’s self-governing institutions, it became clear
to most observers that UNMIK’s ability to “finish the job” would ultimately depend
on a resolution to the question of Kosovo’s final status.  The standards before status
approach gained new impetus in late 2003 with the Contact Group initiative, with
U.N. Security Council approval, to elaborate on and “operationalize” the Standards
for Kosovo and review their implementation by mid-2005 with a view to considering
future status.7  In December 2003, UNMIK and the Kosovo provisional government
established five joint working groups on implementing the standards.  The Kosovo
Serb community did not agree to participate in the working groups.  Nevertheless, on
March 31, 2004, UNMIK chief Holkeri unveiled the Kosovo Standards
Implementation Plan (KSIP), a detailed road map for realizing the Kosovo Standards.
In a presidential statement, the U.N. Security Council strongly condemned the
March 2004 inter-ethnic violence in Kosovo and attacks on KFOR and U.N.
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personnel.  In view of the March events and the need to rebuild inter-ethnic
cooperation, the U.N. Security Council called for urgent steps on two of the
standards: sustainable returns and freedom of movement.8  In the aftermath of the
attacks, some Serbian and European officials called for changes to the U.N. mission’s
mandate in order to improve security conditions in Kosovo. Some major non-
governmental organizations, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International, strongly criticized the performance of U.N. agencies and NATO
operations in Kosovo for failing to protect minority communities.  U.N. Secretary-
General Annan commissioned a U.N. team headed by Kai Eide to review the U.N.
Mission.  Among other things, the Eide report called for a range of policy and
institutional changes to provide greater clarity and focus to the U.N. mission and
future direction of the province.  Eide also said that “serious exploratory discussions”
on future status should begin as early as 2004 and that final status negotiations should
take place by mid-2005, with the participation of the Kosovo government and
Belgrade.  He called for the transfer of more powers from UNMIK to the Kosovo
government, with the aim of terminating the U.N. mission after final status
negotiations begin.  He recommended that the European Union take over as lead
international agency in Kosovo.  The Secretary-General endorsed some of Eide’s
recommendations, especially on the priority standards, but not all of them.
As the status process progressed in 2006, UNMIK continued to work with the
PISG on implementing the standards.  In June 2006, the contact group presented to
the PISG a list of 13 priority standards for immediate attention, with most focused
on minority rights.  In a report to the Security Council in November 2006, Annan
reported progress in implementing the 13 priority standards and a strengthening of
Kosovo’s institutions that has resulted from standards implementation. He decried
incidents of violence and called on local leaders to control possible discontent.  He
expressed continued disappointment that Kosovo Serb leaders remained outside the
political process.9 
The current U.N. mission in Kosovo is projected to terminate after the status
process is completed but retains its authority until Resolution 1244 is no longer in
force.  There is virtually no interest among Kosovar Albanians in prolonging its
tenure, and UNMIK is frequently the target of popular protests.  In his comprehensive
review of the standards in 2005, U.N. envoy Eide noted that the U.N.’s leverage in
Kosovo was already diminishing. Among other factors, UNMIK’s reputation has
suffered from numerous scandals and charges of corruption involving U.N. officials.
The post-status transition process of transferring authority and further competencies
from UNMIK to the Kosovo government is expected to last at least a few months.
KFOR.10  KFOR’s mission, in accordance with UNSC 1244, is to monitor,
verify, and enforce the provisions of the Military Technical Agreement and the KLA
demilitarization agreement.  KFOR is also charged with establishing and maintaining
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a secure environment in Kosovo to facilitate the return of refugees, the delivery of
humanitarian aid, and the operation of the international civilian administration.
KFOR has actively supported UNMIK’s activities, including efforts to meet
benchmarks of progress and to transfer increased responsibilities, especially related
to law enforcement, to Kosovo’s interim civil authorities.  Resolution 1244 includes
a provision that says KFOR is to oversee the return of “hundreds, not thousands” of
Yugoslav troops to Kosovo to liaise with the international presence, mark minefields,
provide a “presence” at Serb historical monuments and “key border crossings.”  No
troops from Serbia and Montenegro have returned to Kosovo for these purposes,
although in March 2001, NATO approved the phased return of Serbia and
Montenegro forces to the formerly demilitarized buffer zone between Kosovo and the
rest of Serbia.
In response to the sudden and widespread ethnic Albanian attacks on Serb
enclaves in March 2004, NATO swiftly made available an additional 3,000 NATO
reserve forces to the former KFOR Commander, Lt. General Holger Kammerhoff.
The performance of KFOR units during the violence varied widely. In the aftermath
of the March incidents, NATO conducted a “lessons learned” study to evaluate
KFOR’s performance and identify areas for improvement.  The study’s
recommendations reportedly included the removal of national restrictions, or caveats,
on COMKFOR’s ability to deploy KFOR troops; improved training and equipment;
improved intelligence capabilities in order to anticipate events such as in March; and
measures to maximize KFOR force presence in patrols.  KFOR also created a
Security Advisory Group with UNMIK and local Kosovar representatives to improve
communication and coordination on security matters.
NATO reviews KFOR’s mission every six months and periodically considers
plans to adjust force structure, reduce force levels, and eventually to withdraw from
Kosovo.  From its peak strength in 1999 of nearly 50,000, KFOR steadily reduced
in size in the following years.  On the basis of its mid-2003 mission review and
reflecting KFOR’s assessment that the overall security situation remained stable,
NATO agreed to continue to “regionalize and rationalize” KFOR’s force structure
and size, including a reduction in strength to about 17,500.  Since December 2003,
however, NATO members have agreed that a large NATO presence in Kosovo
remains necessary and have maintained KFOR strength at about 16,000-17,000, with
additional reinforcement brought in as necessary.  The U.S. share of KFOR remains
below 15% of the total and currently numbers about 1,700 troops. In 2005, the former
NATO SACEUR, General Jones, proposed adjustments to KFOR’s structure to
improve mobility and flexibility.  The adjustments involved streamlining the force
into a task force structure that provides greater efficiency and eliminates the need for
redundant support and logistics units.  
KFOR has also been preparing for possible security challenges as Kosovo’s
future status is deliberated. KFOR and U.N. officials have acknowledged that they
were actively monitoring the activities of “armed, criminal” ethnic Albanian groups
that may be seeking to destabilize the province or disrupt the status negotiation
process.  KFOR reinforced its presence in northern Kosovo to boost security in that
volatile sector.  At the NATO Riga summit in November 2006, alliance members
declared that NATO would remain ready to respond quickly to any threats.  They also
pledged to play a part in the implementation of the security provisions of a status
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settlement.  NATO foreign ministers, meeting on January 26, 2007, expressed strong
support for the Ahtisaari plan on Kosovo’s status.  
The Issue of Kosovo’s Future Status11
Getting to a Status Process
U.N. Resolution 1244 reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and did not prescribe or prejudge a permanent
political resolution to the issue of Kosovo’s status.  It said that Kosovo’s status
should be determined by an unspecified “political process.”  Ethnic Albanians in
Kosovo strongly favor independence of the province from Serbia and its international
recognition as a sovereign state as soon as possible.  In the early years after 1999, the
United States and other Western countries, as well as Kosovo’s neighbors except
Albania, opposed independence for Kosovo.  They expressed concern that an
independent Kosovo could destabilize the region by encouraging separatist ethnic
Albanian forces in Macedonia, as well as Serbia’s Presevo Valley, where many
ethnic Albanians live.
Instead of status, international policy on Kosovo centered around “standards,”
as outlined above, and officials emphasized a policy of”standards before status.”
Kosovar Albanians initially expressed irritation with the benchmarks concept, as they
believed this approach was designed to block their aspirations for independence
indefinitely.  Moreover, they complained that the Constitutional Framework does not
give them enough authority to achieve the benchmarks, especially since UNMIK
retained “reserved competence” in the area of law and order.  More recently,
however, Kosovar Albanian leaders have expressed greater support for the standards
process, especially as it became more directly linked to the prospect of achieving
status.
In November 2003, then-U.S. Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman
announced, with the support of the other members of the international Contact
Group, a formal review in mid-2005 on Kosovo’s progress toward meeting the
standards.  If the Contact Group, the U.N. Security Council and other interested
parties judged that progress was “sufficient,” a process to determine the province’s
status could begin.  UNMIK released a highly detailed “Standards Implementation
Plan” on March 31, 2004.
The violent events of March 2004 led some to question the accepted standards
policy, as well as prospects for the peaceful coexistence of Kosovo’s majority ethnic
Albanian and minority Serb populations.  The Serbian government and parliament
developed a plan to decentralize Kosovo and give the Serb minority self-governing
autonomy.  In July, a U.N. assessment team led by Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide
recommended that the lengthy list of standards be replaced with a “dynamic, priority-
based standards policy” to pave the way for status discussions and future European
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integration.12  At the time, U.N. Secretary-General Annan and successive UNMIK
chiefs defended the standards policy, while identifying urgent priority standards
relating to security and minority rights.  They and other international officials noted
that standards implementation will remain important for Kosovo’s development even
after a status settlement is reached.
International Process on Status
In 2005, the international community established a  “roadmap” toward Kosovo’s
future status.  On May 27, 2005, the U.N. Security Council reviewed a quarterly
report on UNMIK by the U.N. Secretary-General.  On the basis of this report, Annan
sanctioned the launch of the comprehensive review of the Kosovo standards for the
summer.  In June 2005, he appointed Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide, who led an
earlier assessment of UNMIK, to lead the review.  After several trips to the region,
Ambassador Eide submitted his comprehensive review to Annan. On October 24,
2005, the U.N. Security Council endorsed the recommendation of U.N. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan to launch a political process to determine Kosovo’s disputed
status. On November 1, Annan announced his intention to name former Finnish
President Martti Ahtisaari to be his U.N. Special Envoy to lead the international
process.  Ahtisaari began his mission with visits to Kosovo and Serbia in late
November 2005.  He said that he hoped that the two sides would agree to face-to-face
talks in early 2006.  He stressed that there was no deadline set for the completion of
the negotiations.
Prior to the start of negotiations, the contact group agreed on several principles
to guide the status process.  With respect to the status outcome, the contact group
stated that there should be no return of Kosovo to the pre-1999 situation, no partition
of Kosovo, and no union of Kosovo with any or part of another country.  It also
called for the settlement to ensure sustainable multi-ethnicity in Kosovo, effective
local self-government and multi-ethnic coexistence through the process of
decentralization, and safeguards for cultural and religious sites.13  The Contact Group
stressed that “all possible efforts should be made to achieve a negotiated settlement
in the course of 2006.”
The Vienna Talks.  The status talks began in Vienna in February 2006. The
initial rounds of the negotiations dealt with so-called “technical issues” that were
meant to prepare the way for tackling the determination of future status.  These
included protecting cultural and religious sites, financial issues such as deciding
Kosovo’s share of Serbia’s debts, and the decentralization of Kosovo’s government,
including redrawing the borders of Kosovo’s municipalities.  Ahtisaari and his
deputies refrained from making specific proposals, instead permitting the Serbian and
Kosovar delegations to put forth and discuss their own views.  The positions of the
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two sides remained far apart on most issues, and little movement toward compromise
solutions was reported. 
One of most important issue dealt with in Vienna was the decentralization of
Kosovo’s government, an issue that included possible solutions to the divided
northern city of Mitrovica, a key potential flashpoint.  Serbs have proposed the
creation of a large number of Serb-majority municipalities within Kosovo, based on
the Serb population of Kosovo before most Serbs fled the province in 1999 and on
the location of Serbian cultural and religious monuments.  The Serbs also sought the
formal division of the northern city of Mitrovica (which is already de facto divided),
separating its Serb-majority part north of the Ibar River from the ethnic Albanian-
dominated southern part. These municipalities would be controlled by local Serb
authorities, with their own police, and would be closely linked with each other and
with Serbia.  In contrast, the Kosovar Albanians offered to permit the creation of only
a handful of Serb municipalities, based on Kosovo’s current Serbian population, and
have demanded that Mitrovica be at least nominally united.14  
On July 24, 2006, Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu and Prime Minister Agim
Ceku met with their Serbian counterparts Boris Tadic and Vojislav Kostunica to
discuss the status issue, in the first direct meeting between the two sides at the
leadership.  Both sides reiterated their long-stated views on status, and little progress
toward a compromise was reached.  Ahtisaari has called the positions of the two
sides “as far apart as possible.”
The Ahtisaari Proposal and Next Steps.  U.N. Special Envoy Martti
Ahtisaari was expected to present his proposal for Kosovo’s status to the contact
group and the U.N. Security Council in late 2006.  After leading technical talks and
status negotiations with the Kosovar Albanian and Serbian parties in Vienna since
early 2006, Ahtisaari could report no major progress in reaching a negotiated
settlement on status but said he was still prepared to come forward with a status
proposal. The contact group and especially the United States had long emphasized
a preference to conclude the Kosovo status talks in 2006.  On November 10,
however, Ahtisaari announced that he would postpone releasing his status proposal
in order to avoid it having an adverse influence on key early elections in Serbia.  His
announcement stated: 
In the light of the announcement by President Tadic to hold Serbian
parliamentary elections on 21 January 2007, and after consulting with the
Contact Group today, I have decided to present my proposal for the settlement
of Kosovo status to the parties without delay after the parliamentary elections in
Serbia.
Following the January 21 vote in Serbia, which produced inconclusive results,
Ahtisaari presented his Kosovo status proposal to representatives of the contact group
on January 26, in Vienna. The Ahtisaari plan has not yet been made public, but the
package is said to include substantial provisions on the protection of minority rights.
According to a statement by Ahtisaari to the Council of Europe on January 24, the
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status proposal provides “the foundation for a democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo
in which the rights and interests of all members of its communities are firmly
guaranteed and protected by institutions based on the rule of law.”15   
Ahtisaari is next scheduled to present his settlement proposal to both Belgrade
and Pristina on February 2 for further discussion and negotiation with the parties.  At
that point, his office is to release summaries and fact sheets on the settlement
package to the public. This consultation phase may last several weeks.
The status package will eventually be presented to the U.N. Security Council for
review and for the Council’s consideration of a new UNSC resolution on Kosovo.
The timing of U.N. action is not yet clear. Moreover, consensus within both the
contact group and the Security Council is far from assured, adding further doubt to
prospects of swift action.  Talks within the Security Council on Kosovo’s status
could become difficult if the Albanian and Serbian parties do not reach a compromise
agreement, which is not considered likely.  In particular, Russian leaders have made
repeated statements opposing an imposed settlement for Kosovo or arbitrary
deadlines, and threatening to use the Russian veto in the Security Council.  Russian
officials have also warned that an outcome for Kosovo could serve as a precedent for
other territorial disputes, such as in the Caucasus; in contrast, U.S. and European
officials contend that Kosovo’s situation is unique and that a status outcome in
Kosovo would not have any relevance to other parts of the world.
According to both early and recent media accounts, Ahtisaari’s proposal will
likely recommend that Kosovo become independent but with limited sovereignty, not
dissimilar to long-standing proposals for “managed” or “conditional” independence
for Kosovo.  The term “independence” is reportedly not even mentioned in his
proposal and may not be in a future U.N. resolution on Kosovo,16 possibly leaving
some status issues open to interpretation. However, Kosovo is expected to be able to
enter into international agreements and join international organizations.17  A new
UNSC resolution is otherwise expected to incorporate several aspects of minority
rights and inter-ethnic relations dealt with during the Vienna negotiations, close out
the UNMIK mission, and authorize new international missions to implement the
status settlement. 
The EU and NATO are expected to lead the post-status international missions.
European leaders have pledged to stand ready “to enhance its role in Kosovo
following a status determination, in particular in the areas of police, rule of law, and
the economy.”18 An EU-led civilian office may include an EU “high representative”
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with some broad powers19 as well as other international (including U.S.) officials.
The EU is also expected to launch a rule of law mission under its European Security
and Defense Policy (ESDP).  An EU planning team has been in place in Kosovo to
plan for a possible post-status EU operation. The transition period in the immediate
aftermath of a status settlement is likely to serve as critical proving ground for a
possibly long-term EU mission.  EU leaders have called for political and legal
“clarity” in the future status settlement — which should include above all a new U.N.
resolution — in order to facilitate a swift EU response and a smooth transition.20  As
noted above, NATO expects to continue to provide an international security presence
in Kosovo, most likely at its current strength, for the near term. 
Ethnic Albanian and Serbian Perspectives
The negotiation approach set out by Ahtisaari, with its initial focus on “technical
aspects,” appeared to recognize the completely opposing positions of the Albanian
Serbian parties on status itself.  It is the position of virtually the entire ethnic
Albanian community in Kosovo that the independence of Kosovo is non-negotiable.
The opening of status talks in 2006 spurred some tensions within the ethnic Albanian
community.  There was jockeying for advantage among the leading parties in Kosovo
over the composition of the negotiating team for the talks, perhaps signaling a
struggle between the Liberal Democratic Party of Kosovo (LDK) and the main
opposition party, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and other parties over who
should get credit for what they see as Kosovo’s impending independence.  Despite
these pressures, the Unity Team involved in status negotiations has remained together
thus far.  Groups outside of the established political parties have mobilized some
grass-roots support in opposition to any notion of compromise or negotiation of
independence.  They have organized periodic rallies against UNMIK and even
Kosovar Albanian leaders. 
Kosovo’s leaders insist that Kosovo achieve independence and are concerned
about a prolonged delay in the process as well as an unclear outcome.  The
government responded calmly  to Ahtisaari’s news of postponing his status proposal
until early 2007, but a public rally in Pristina in late November threatened to turn
violent, and many observers believe that Kosovar frustrations could easily explode.21
The Serbian government, as well as Kosovo’s Serbian community, are strongly
opposed to Kosovo’s independence, and this view is backed by virtually all political
parties in Serbia. Serbian leaders have encapsulated their broad position on status
with the phrase “more than autonomy, but less than independence” and have
expressed willingness to discuss any aspect of Kosovar self-rule except for full
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independence.  Kosovo Serbs have participated in the U.N. status talks as part of the
Serbian delegation. Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica has repeatedly insisted that
independence for Kosovo would violate Serbia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty
and lead to greater instability inside Kosovo and in the region.  Perhaps in
preparation for an unwelcome status proposal, the Serbian government has become
increasingly critical of U.N. Special Envoy Ahtisaari and has called for him to resign.
It also suggests that Ahtisaari’s proposal, when it is released, should be subject to
further talks. 
Serbia’s internal political situation has become closely intertwined with the
Kosovo status process.  Although long at odds with each other, President Tadic and
Prime Minister Kostunica achieved an important political consensus in the fall of
2006 on preparing a new Serbian constitution and then holding long-awaited early
parliamentary elections.  Passed by parliament and endorsed by a public referendum,
the constitution names Kosovo to be an integral part of Serbia.  According to
Kostunica, the new constitution helps safeguard Serbia’s territorial integrity; in
contrast, U.S. officials stated that Serbia’s constitutional process has no direct
bearing on the Kosovo status process, which is led by the United Nations.  Early
parliamentary elections were then scheduled for January 21, 2007, and a new
presidential vote will be held in May. Serbia’s leaders had appealed for a delay in the
international process to determine Kosovo’s future status until after the January
elections, lest an unfavorable outcome fuel radical nationalist sentiment and boost
the electoral fortunes of Serbia’s Radical Party.  In November, Serbia’s gambit paid
off, with a delay of the status process until after the election.  The January vote itself,
which was viewed to be free and fair, produced another strong showing for the
Radical Party, although most observers expect the democratic parties to be able to
form a new government, led by Tadic’s Democratic Party.  Coalition talks, however,
may take some time and will take place at the same time as Ahtisaari’s plan for
Kosovo moves forward. 
Some observers have speculated that if Serbia is not able to prevent Kosovo
from achieving independence, it may seek to secure a partition of Kosovo, with
northern Kosovo formally becoming part of Serbia and the rest becoming
independent.22  However, the United States and other members of the Contact Group
have already ruled out a formal partition of Kosovo as an acceptable status option.
Serbian leaders may also seek or be offered other forms of compensation, such as
easier terms for NATO and EU membership, or at least increased aid from these
institutions and their member countries.23  However, Serbian Prime Minister
Kostunica has rejected any notion of a trade-off between Euro-Atlantic integration
and Kosovo.
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Some observers are also concerned that Serbia might attempt to destabilize the
situation on the ground in Kosovo, if the status outcome leads to independence.
Belgrade has already discouraged the participation of Kosovo Serbs in the Kosovo
central government and UNMIK.  In June 2006, local Serb authorities in northern
Kosovo announced they were cutting ties to UNMIK and the Kosovo government,
due to violence against Serbs, and called for the deployment of police from Serbia
to their region.  Some analysts fear that Serbia could unilaterally attempt to partition
northern Kosovo or encourage Serbs to leave Kosovo in large numbers.  KFOR’s
reinforced presence in northern Kosovo reflects international concern about the
possibility of the north becoming a flashpoint as the status process winds down.
U.S. Policy
From the beginning of the conflict in Kosovo in the late 1990s, the Clinton
Administration condemned Serbian human rights abuses and called for autonomy for
Kosovo within Yugoslavia, while opposing independence.  The Clinton
Administration pushed for air strikes against Yugoslavia when Belgrade rejected the
Rambouillet accords in March 1999, but refused to consider the use of ground troops
to eject Yugoslav forces from Kosovo.  However, even before the air strikes, the
Clinton Administration said that U.S. troops would participate in a Kosovo
peacekeeping force if a peace agreement were reached.  After the conflict, President
Clinton said that the U.S. and  NATO troop commitment to Kosovo could be reduced
as local autonomous institutions took  hold.  He said that the United States and the
European Union must work together to rebuild Kosovo and the region, but that
“Europe must provide most of te resources.”24
During the 2000 Presidential campaign, Condoleezza Rice, later appointed by
President-elect Bush as his National Security Advisor, said that U.S. military forces
were overextended globally, and that peacekeeping responsibilities in the Balkans
should be taken over by U.S. allies in Europe.  However, after taking office, the
Administration  appeared to adopt a more cautious tone.  In February 2001, former
Secretary of State Colin Powell said that the United States had a commitment to
peace in the Balkans  and that NATO forces would have to remain in Bosnia and
Kosovo for “years.”  He said the United States would review U.S. troop levels in
Bosnia and Kosovo with the objective of reducing them over time, but stressed that
the United States would act in consultation with its allies and was not “cutting and
running.”
During a July 24, 2001, visit to U.S. troops in Kosovo, President Bush reiterated
this position, saying that
we will not draw down our forces in Bosnia or Kosovo precipitously or
unilaterally.  We came in together, and we will go out together.  But our goal is
to hasten the day when peace is self-sustaining, when local, democratically
elected authorities can assume full responsibility, and when NATO’s forces can
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go home.  This means that we must re-organize and re-energize our efforts to
build civil institutions and promote rule of law.  It also means that we must step
up our efforts to transfer responsibilities for public security from combat forces
to specialized units, international police, and ultimately local authorities.
NATO’s commitment to the peace of this region is enduring, but the stationing
of our forces here should not be indefinite.
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States (including the
deployment of U.S. troops to Afghanistan) and the conflict in Iraq reinforced the
Administration’s desire to decrease the U.S. deployment in the Balkans.  The number
of troops in KFOR has declined from about 38,000 in June 2002 to under 17,000
today, with the U.S. contingent falling from 5,500 to 1,700.  Although NATO
terminated its Stabilization Force in Bosnia and turned over peacekeeping duties to
the EU, no such changes have been agreed to for Kosovo, reflecting the more
precarious security situation in Kosovo.
The Bush Administration supported the “standards before status” policy favored
by UNMIK beginning in 2002.  This approach called for the autonomous Kosovo
government to achieve a number of benchmarks (including progress toward creating
a functioning democratic government, free market economy, the rule of law and
respect for ethnic minorities) before the issue of Kosovo’s status is discussed.  In
November 2003, the Bush Administration launched an initiative to give greater
impetus to the “standards before status” policy.  Former Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs Marc Grossman, backed by other members of the Contact Group,
announced a “review date” strategy for the Kosovo standards that will lead to an
evaluation of the standards for Kosovo by mid-2005.  Should Kosovo meet the
standards, he said that the international community would be prepared “to begin a
process to determine Kosovo’s future status.”  He also said that “all options are on
the table,” but that the United States would not take a position on final status at this
time.25
On March 17, 2004, the State Department issued a statement strongly deploring
the incidents of serious violence in Kosovo and calling for the restoration of calm and
order and cooperation with international agencies.  Since that event, senior U.S.
officials continued to emphasize the standards and review date strategy, while giving
particular emphasis to the priority standards relating to the treatment of ethnic
minorities in Kosovo.
In May 2005, the second Bush Administration announced a new phase in U.S.
policy in the Balkans. Emphasizing the need to “finish the work” in the region,
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns testified before Congress
that the status quo of Kosovo’s unresolved status was no longer sustainable or
desirable.  He expressed U.S. support for the standards review timetable in 2005,
possibly leading to status negotiations later in the year.  He said that a settlement
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could be expected to be achieved by the end of 2006 and that the United States would
remain an active partner in Kosovo.
As a possible reinforcement of the U.N.-led talks on Kosovo’s status in Vienna,
Secretary of State Rice has met with both Kosovar and Serbian leaders in
Washington, DC, in 2006.  She met with Kosovo President Sejdiu and Prime
Minister Ceku in June and with Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica in July
2006.  She reportedly called for all sides to show flexibility in the negotiation
process.
According to the Department of Defense Comptroller’s Office, DOD
incremental costs for Kosovo through FY2005 (estimated) were $9.1 billion.  This
figure included $1.89 billion for the 1999 NATO air war, $7.0 billion for KFOR, and
$141.6 million in refugee aid.26  From FY1999-FY2006, the United States obligated
about $865 million in bilateral aid to Kosovo.27  The Administration’s FY2007
request included $79 million for Kosovo. 
Congressional Response
In 1999, the 106th Congress debated whether U.S. and NATO air strikes in
Kosovo were in the U.S. national interest, and whether the President could undertake
them without congressional approval.  In the end, Congress neither explicitly
approved nor blocked the air strikes, but appropriated funds for the air campaign and
the U.S. peacekeeping deployment in Kosovo after the fact.  In 2000, some Members
unsuccessfully attempted to condition the U.S. military deployment in Kosovo on
Congressional approval and on the implementation of aid pledges made by European
countries.  Many Members of Congress said that they expected U.S. allies in Europe
to contribute the lion’s share of aid to the region and expressed concern that
European countries were slow to implement their aid pledges.  Congress moved to
limit U.S. aid to Kosovo to 15% of the total amount pledged by all countries.28
The 107th Congress focused on limiting the cost of the continuing U.S.
engagement in Kosovo.  For example, the FY2002 foreign aid appropriations law
(P.L. 107-115) specified that aid to Kosovo “should not exceed 15 percent of the total
resources pledged by all donors for calendar year 2002 for assistance for Kosovo as
of March 31, 2002.” It also barred U.S. aid for “large scale physical infrastructure
reconstruction” in Kosovo.  In subsequent years, Congress occasionally earmarked
aid levels for Kosovo. 
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Kosovo’s status has been another theme in legislation. In the 108th Congress,
several resolutions were introduced that advocate U.S. support for Kosovo’s
independence.  In the first session,  H.Res. 11 and H.Res. 28 were introduced,
expressing the sense of the House that the United States should declare support for
Kosovo’s independence. In the Senate,  S.Res. 144 expressed the sense of the Senate
that the United States should support the right of the people of Kosovo to determine
their political future once “requisite progress” is made in achieving U.N. benchmarks
in developing democratic institutions and human rights protections. 
In the wake of the March 2004 violence in Kosovo, several resolutions were
introduced to condemn the attacks, as well as subsequent attacks on Islamic sites in
Serbia.  These included H.Res. 587, introduced by Representative Christopher Smith,
and H.Res. 596, introduced by Representative Burton.  On April 8, the Senate agreed
by unanimous consent to S.Res. 326, introduced by Senator Voinovich.  The
resolution, a slightly modified companion version of H.Res. 596, strongly
condemned the violence; recognized the commitment of Kosovo and Serbian leaders
to rebuild what had been destroyed and encourage the return of refugees; called on
leaders in Kosovo to renounce violence and build a multi-ethnic society based on the
standards for Kosovo; recommended the restructuring of UNMIK; and urged the
reinvigoration of dialogue between Kosovo and Belgrade.  S.Res. 384, offered by
Senator Lugar on June 18, called on the United States to work with KFOR, UNMIK,
and the Kosovo and Serbian governments to implement the Standards for Kosovo.
The 109th Congress also considered legislation on Kosovo.  On January 4, 2005,
Representative Lantos introduced H.Res. 24, which expressed the sense of the House
that the United States should support Kosovo’s independence. On October 7, 2005,
the Senate passed S.Res. 237, a resolution supporting efforts to “work toward an
agreement on the future status of Kosovo and a plan for transformation in Kosovo.”
It did not express support for any particular status option.  The resolution passed
without amendment by unanimous consent.  An identical House resolution was
introduced on December 17, 2005 (H.Res. 634).
At the start of the 110th Congress, Representative Lantos introduced H.Res. 36
on January 5, 2007, which calls on the United States to, among other things, support
Kosovo’s independence within its existing borders as a sovereign and democratic
state.  As the international process to determine Kosovo’s status progresses in 2007,
additional bills on Kosovo’s status may be introduced.
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Figure 1.  Map of Kosovo
